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I Introduction
Our nation has long struggled with the question of how much government
regulation is ideal in various areas of our lives. From the founding to the
present day, pitched battles have raged over whether government should,
among other things, mandate minimum wages, regulate abortion, institute
military drafts, or intervene to rescue the economy. With today's obesity
epidemic, a new front has been opened: What steps should the government
take to slim down our nation's collective waistline, and how intrusive should
those steps be? Some states and cities already have decided what initial steps to
take. New York City garnered national attention when it banned trans fats in
restaurant food,' and California followed suit. 2 Recently, New York Governor
David Paterson attempted to narrow his state's budget gap--and waistline-by
imposing a "fat tax" on sugary beverages.3 Now, both New York City and
California are at the forefront of another trend: Requiring restaurants to post
nutritional information on their menus. 4
1. See New York City Passes Trans Fat Ban, MsNBc.com, Dec. 5, 2006.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/1605 1436/ (last visited Mar. 22,2010) (discussing then-recent
passage of New York City plan to phase out trans fats) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). For the text of the plan, see N.Y., N.Y., Ruu~s OF THE CITY OF N.Y., rrr. 24,
HEALTH CODE, § 81.08 (2006).
2. See Patrick McGreevy, State Bans Trans Fats, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 2008, at Al
(describing new state ban on trans fats).
3. See Sewell Chan, A Tax on Many Soft Drinks Sets off a SpiritedDebate,N.Y. TimES,
Dec. 17, 2008, at A36 ("The Paterson administration's proposal for an 18 percent tax on sugary
sodas and juice driks... has already touched off a vigorous debate among New
Yorkers ... ."). For another example of this trend, see Kim Severson, Throwing the Book at
Salt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at D I (describing New York City's effort to cut the amount of
salt in restaurant and prepackaged meals). Health Commissioner Dr. Thomas Frieden proposes
voluntary cuts for now, with more to come within a decade; legislation may deal with the issue
if the food industry does not cooperate. Id
4. See N.Y., N.Y., RuLEs OF THE Crry' OF N.Y., rrr. 24, HEALTH CODE, § 81.50 (repealed
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At a glance, requiring the posting of nutritional information should be
an uncontroversial and unalloyed good. Given that the proportion of obese
Americans more than doubled between the 1970s and the early 2000s, and
that more than half of New Yorkers were either overweight or obese by
2006,5 the city and the country at large have a clear incentive to do
something to reverse the trend towards larger waistlines. Because calories
are arguably the critical piece of information governing weight gain,6 and
because Americans also consume one-third of their calories away from
home (for example, at restaurants),7 requiring restaurants to post caloric
information does not seem unreasonable. Even the noted libertarian Judge
Richard Posner gives the calorie posting law a tepid endorsement.8
However, the restaurants affected by the regulations generally fight them in
every available venue, and there is scholarship vigorously opposing these
laws as well. 9 Regardless of the eventual legal outcome in this area, the
critical consideration is to gain some sort of stability and predictabilityneither restaurants on the one hand nor legislators and the public on the
other are served by uncertainty in this field, as restaurants will be confused
as to which regulations they are legally obliged to adhere, legislators will
be frustrated by an inability to know what regulations will be upheld by the
2008) (detailing plan to require disclosure of nutritional information); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 114094 (West Supp. 2009) (detailing California's statutory scheme to require
restaurants to post nutritional information on their menu boards).
5. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NIYSRA4 1), 509 F. Supp. 2d 351,
353 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
6. See id. (stating that New York contends that caloric intake is the critical information
relating to weight gain).
7. Id.
8. See Richard A. Posner, Compelled Disclosure of Food Characteristics,BECKERPosNERBLoG,

July 27,2008, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2008/07/compelled_

discl.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) (making the libertarian case for upholding New York's
compelled disclosure of caloric information) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Posner's justification for supporting the regulation is that it may help to reduce
obesity by giving information to consumers in a frightening way and that "it will yield valuable
information about the effects of public interventions designed to alter life styles." Id.
9. See, e.g., Nicole Anderson, Note, Would You Like Some FirstAmendmentRights with
That? How Mandatory NutritionalDisclosure on Restaurant Menus Violates the Freedom of
CommercialSpeech, 36 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 105,106 (2008) (attacking mandatory disclosure
of nutritional information on First Amendment grounds). Anderson argues that Regulation
81.50 is "not directly related to the state's interest and is far broader than what is necessary to
accomplish the state's purpose of decreasing obesity rates." Id. at 107. She argues vociferously
that Regulation 81.50 is unconstitutional under existing First Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at
117. This Note, by contrast, will argue that while Regulation 81.50 is arguably unconstitutional
under existing jurisprudence, the real problem in this area is that there is currently no
appropriate standard to apply.
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courts, and consumers may not get the information they desire from
restaurants. This Note offers some suggestions for how to achieve this needed
certainty.
Part 11 of this Note explores both the history of these laws and regulations
and some present-day efforts to curb health evils such as trans fats and sodium.
Part III then discusses the grounds on which opponents fight rules such as New
York City of Health Code Regulation § 81.50 (Regulation 81.50), particularly
as relates to freedom of commercial speech under the First Amendment. It
explores challenges to these rules both on philosophical and legal grounds,
examining libertarian arguments for and against such regulations as well as
Supreme Court and circuit-level opinions coming down on both sides of the
issue. Part IV applies commercial free speech doctrine to Regulation 81.50 to
try to determine its chances of being upheld. In particular, Part IV applies the
CentralHudson test to such requirements, but also explains why no existing
test is a comfortable fit. Part IV goes on to suggest an alternative test for this
particular type of compelled disclosure. Finally, Part V explores some of the
implications of the new test, and also recommends some means of compliance
that would be beneficial to states, consumers, and businesses.
HI. History of utritionalLabeling Laws and Regulations
A. GeneralHistory
The United States has a fairly long history of requiring some sort of
labeling on food and drugs. The 1938 passage of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA)'0 is regarded as a watershed moment in the regulation of
these items." It required that all drugs be approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) before they could be brought to market and also created

new standards for safety in the food

Supply.'12

Critically, for labeling purposes,

the law strengthened requirements that food and drugs not be misbranded or
adulterated. "
10.

21 U.S.C. §§ 30 1-399 (2006).

11. See United States Food and Drug Administration, The 1938 Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, HISTORY OF THE FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/
Origin/ucmn054826.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 20 10) (stating that the FDCA was a critical law in
regulating the quality of food and drugs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See id. (last visited Mar. 22,2010) (giving history leading up to enactment of FDCA
and provisions of the statute) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (listing prohibited acts under the FDCA, including the
introduction into interstate commerce of any adulterated or misbranded foods or drugs).
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The next critical step in labeling laws came in 1990, with the passage of
the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA). 14 The NLEA
required the FDA to deem a food intended for human consumption misbranded
unless the food contained a label showing the serving size of the product, the
number of calories, the amount of fat, and various other pieces of nutritional
information.'15 This legislation, of course, gave Americans the now-ubiquitous
nutritional labels that appear on virtually every product found in refrigerators
and pantries.
Since NLEA, the federal government has not taken steps to change
significantly the way consumers receive nutritional information. Recently,
however, cities and states have filled the void by crafting their own regulatory
regimes. In 2004, eighteen restaurants in Tiburon, California, all certified that
they were trans fat free. 16At
around the same time, a nonprofit public
advocacy group sued Kraft for having trans fats in Oreo cookies, claiming that
the fats had extremely negative health consequences. 17Nationwide awareness
of trans fats increased monumentally.'18 Soon thereafter, state and local
governments took action to combat the perceived problem. In December 2006,
New York City became the first municipality in the nation to pass a ban on the
use of trans fats in restaurants.'19 New York, however, was merely the first of
many jurisdictions to act against trans fats, as numerous cities and the State of
California"0 have now banned their restaurants from cooking with them.2
Having dealt with the trans fat problem, many of those same cities and states
14. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 2, 104 Stat.
2353, 2353 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343).
15. Id.
16. See Ban Trans Fats, THE CAMPAIGN To BAN PARTIALLY HYDROGENATED OILS, Project
Tiburon: America's FirstTrans Fat-FreeCity!!!, http://www.bantransfats.conm/projecttiburon.
htmal (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) (describing efforts of city restaurants to rid themselves of trans
fats) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. See, e.g., Molly Selvin, Lawyer Who Took on Oreos and McDonald's Fights on in
Food War, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, at ClI (discussing suit against Kraft for having trans fats
in Oreos).
18. See id ("The Oreos lawsuit inspired a top-1O list from David Letterman, a rant by
Rush Limbaugh and a flood of nasty e-mails.").
19. See New York City Passes Trans FatBan, supra note 1 (describing New York ban on
trans fats and noting support from Mayor Michael Bloomberg).

20. See Ban Trans Fats,

THE CAMPAIGN To BAN PARTIALLY HYDROGENATED OILS,

http://www.bantransfats.com (last visited Mar. 22, 20 10) (listing New York City, Philadelphia,
and the state of California as jurisdictions that have banned trans fats) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. See McGreevy, supranote 2 (reporting that Governor Schwarzenegger had signed the
trans fats ban, making California the first state in the nation to ban the use of cooking oils
containing trans fats in its restaurants).
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have now set about finding additional ways to help their citizens learn about
health risks and combat obesity.
One example is New York Governor Paterson's recent proposal to close
22
his state's budget deficit by imposing an 18% tax on sugary beverages.
Although the tax, which is projected to raise $404 million in fiscal year 2009,23

has been pushed mainly as a measure to reduce obesity,2 4 the beverage industry
has characterized it purely as a money-raising measure.2
This cynical
characterization appears to have some legitimacy, as the state budget faces a
$15 billion shortfall in the next year.2 Still, the New York Times has endorsed
the governor's budget proposal,2 so it may have establishment support and
momentum. New York is not the only jurisdiction to have proposed such a
tax.2 8 Thus, the next frontier in health regulation may be taxes on sugary foods
and beverages.
For now, though, the major trend in the war against obesity is to require
restaurants to post calorie information, a trend that New York City has helped
lead. The city passed Regulation § 81.50 in December, 2006,2 which required
all restaurants that already made public nutrition information on their food to
display the amount of calories in each of their dishes on their menus .30 In so

22. See Chan, supra note 3, at A36 (describing tax measure as an "obesity tax" on
"nondiet sodas and fr~uit drinks containing less than 70 percent natural fruit juice").
23. Id.
24. See id. (quoting New York State Budget Director Laura L. Anglin as stating that there
is "an obesity epidemic: One out of every four New Yorkers is obese, up from about 14 percent
in 1995"). The article goes on to say that the state projects lowered soft drink consumption of
about five percent. Id.
25. See id. (quoting a beverage industry spokesman as saying that "[tjhis is purely a
money grab that would be paid for by hard-working New York families"). Additionally, the
beverage industry has warned that some of the 160,000 jobs supported by the New York state
beverage industry could be lost as a result of the tax. Id.
26. See Danny Hakim & Jeremy W. Peters, Taxes andFees to Rise $4 Billion in Budget
Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2008, at Al (noting that the New York state budget deficit has
grown to $15 billion and disclosing a number of items to be taxed at higher rates in Governor
Paterson's budget proposal, including sugary drinks, fuirs and boats).
27. See Editorial, Gov. Paterson's Tough Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at A42
("Governor Paterson must keep pushing his proposals in Albany. Now that he's created a good
budget, the tougher job will be persuading the state's many special interests and their hand
puppets in the Legislature to help rescue New York. ... )
28. See Chan, supra note 3, at A36 (discussing a tax on sodas and sugary drinks passed in
Maine and a similar proposed, though still unpassed, measure in San Francisco).
29. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA 1), 509 F. Supp. 2d
351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (providing history of the regulation).
30. See id. (describing requirements imposed by the regulation).
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doing, New York hoped to stop the increasing levels of obesity in the city.'
This initial version of the regulation was struck down by the Southern District
of New York on the ground that it was preempted by federal law.3 The district
court ruled that FDA regulations occupied the field of optional nutritional
disclosures by restaurants,3
thus preempting New York's original
Regulation 81.50, which required disclosures only by restaurants that already
made nutritional information public.3 That setback, however, did not prevent
New York or other jurisdictions from continuing their pursuit of a requirement
for restaurants to disclose the amount of calories in their food.
B. New York's CurrentRegulation

In January 2008, almost immediately after the first version of
Regulation 81 .5035 was struck down, New York City promulgated a new
version of the regulation.3 This new version requires restaurants with fifteen
or more outlets to post calorie information on their food products on menu
boards in their restaurants.3 This information is to be listed in a manner so that
customers can ascertain with which item the calorie count is associated .3 8 To
ensure compliance, the item's calorie information must use "a font and format
that is at least as prominent, in size and appearance, as that used to post either
the name or price of the menu
lte.,39 The regulation gives requirements for
how to calculate calories; it also mandates that when an item has over fifty
31. See id (giving details from declaration provided by head of city's health board, which
cited statistics claiming that the proportion of overweight and obese New Yorkers has gone up
rapidly in recent years).
32. See id at 363 (granting summary judgment to New York State Restaurant Association
(NYSRA) on grounds that the city regulation was preempted by federal legislation); see also
infra Part III.B (discussing challenges to the first version of Regulation 81.50).
33. See id. at 362 (asserting that New York City was preempted from regulating nutrient
content claims in any manner inconsistent with federal law).
34. See id at 352 ("[Regulation 81.50] would require New York City Restaurants who
already make the calorie content information of their menu items publicly available to post such
information on their menu boards and menus.").
35. N.Y., N.Y., RULES OF THE CrTy OF NEW YORK, rrr. 24, HEALTH CODE, § 81.50
(repealed 2008).
36. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA 11), No. 08 Civ.
1000(RII-), 2008 WL 1752455, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,2008) (giving factual background on
new version of regulation).
37. N.Y., N.Y., RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Trr. 24, HEALTH CODE, § 81 .50(a)-(c)
(2008).
38. Id § 81.50(c).
39. Id
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calories the count should be rounded to the nearest ten; items of less than fifty
calories should be rounded to the nearest five .40 The regulation also mandates
rules for food items displayed for sale with tags4 ' and for restaurants with drivethrough windows.4 In addition, the regulation contains rules mandating the
manner in which restaurants post calorie informnation on food items that have
different flavors, varieties, and combinations, such as "beverages, ice cream,
pizza, and doughnuts. 43 Finally, the regulation contains a severability clause,
which states that "[ilf any provision of this section ... is held invalid. . ., the
remaining provisions or the application of the section to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected.""4 The regulation is short, but it can appear
fairly complicated. Its essence, though, is as the Southern District of New York
described it: "Regulation 81.50 requires certain chain restaurants. ...
to post
4
caloric content information in their menus and on their menu boards. " 1
City officials have used a number of health justifications for promulgating
the regulation. In New York State RestaurantAss'n v. New York City Boardof
Health (NYSRA 1), the City stated that more than half of its resident adults were
overweight or obese,46 and that those afflicted are at higher risk for many
diseases.4 The City also asserted that calories were "the single most important
piece of nutritional information related to weight gain,"'48 and that consumers'
lack of information about their restaurant meals "[led them] to underestimate
the caloric content of their away-from-home meals.",49 In the initial press
release hailing passage of the regulation, Health Commissioner Dr. Thomas R.
Frieden said the following: "Obesity and diabetes are the only major health
40. Id. § 81.50(c)(1).
41. See id § 81 .50(c)(2) ("When a food item is displayed for sale with a food item tag,
such food item tag shall include the calorie content value for that food item in a font size and
format at least as prominent as the font size of the name of the food item.").
42. See id. § 81 .50(c)(3) (requiring calorie information postings on stanchions next to
drive-through menus on which text must be at least as prominent as text displaying item name or
price).
43. See id. § 81 .50(c)(4)(i) (allowing restaurants to post a range of calorie values for
combinations, but requiring them to post one value if only one is possible for the combination).
44. Id. § 81.50(e).
45. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City B~d. of Health (NYSRA I]), No. 08 Civ.
1000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008).
46. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA 1), 509 F. Supp. 2d
351,353 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("In New York City, more than half of adults are overweight (34.4%)
or obese (2 1.7%).").
47. See id (citing New York's contention that overweight or obese people are at higher
risk for diabetes, heart disease, stroke, and cancer).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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problems that are getting worse in New York City. Today, [we] passed a
regulation that will help New Yorkers make healthier choices . . .. "' The
release further asserts that people use calorie information when it is on hand,
and that the regulation could thus reduce obesity numbers by 150,000 and
diabetes numbers by 30,000 over the next five years. 5'
III. Challenges to NutritionalLabeling Laws and Regulations
A. LibertarianArguments
Many observers oppose regulations meant to curb obesity (like New York
City's) on philosophical grounds. Professor Richard Epstein, one of the
nation's more prominent libertarian thinkers, is one such person. 52 Epstein
begins with the premise that "the sound background presumption against
government intervention has not been overcome 5 3 in the case of efforts to curb
obesity. Epstein also believes that scientific evidence relating to obesity's
causes and effects is inconclusive.5 While he points out flaws in some of the
measurement tools used to determine levels of obesity, such as body-mass
index (BMI), he concedes that "the underlying trends [of increasing BMI
levels] are ominous." 5 5 Still, he goes on to note that obesity is not necessarily
the only cause of death for the 300,000 people that the Department of Health
and Human Services claims it kills every year.56 Epstein also makes the point
that it has become easier to eat out than to eat at home as fast-food restaurants
After
have proliferated and women have moved into the workforce.5
50. Press Release, New York Dep't of Health and Mental Hygiene, Board ofHealth Votes
to Require ChainRestaurantsto Display CalorieInformation in New York City (Jan. 22, 2008),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/htmlpr2008/PrOO8-08. shtml (last visited Mar. 22, 20 10) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
51. See id ("When people have access to calorie information, they use it.").
52. See generally Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) to Do About Obesity: A Moderate
AristotelianAnswer, 93 GEo. L.J. 1361 (2005) (discussing Epstein's opposition to government
efforts to curb obesity).
53. Id. at 1364.
54. See id at 1365-66 (describing various conclusions of literature on the subject of
obesity and asserting that observers could draw any number of different conclusions from
reading this literature).
55. Id. at 1367.
56. See id. at 1369-70 (giving other possibilities for causes of death relating to obesity,
such as obesity's being the manifestation of an underlying condition). Additionally, Epstein
points out that if obesity did not cause deaths, there is no way to know when people killed by
obesity would otherwise die. Id. at 1370.
57. See id. at 13 71 (crediting Inas Rishad and Michael Grossman for the proposition that
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discussing the various problems associated with obesity science, Epstein asserts
that governments have four main options in trying to combat obesity: a fat tax
(perhaps like the one proposed by Governor Paterson); systems of regulations
(such as the one adopted in New York City); systems of liability for food
suppliers; or education.5 Epstein ultimately concludes that because of the
allegedly shaky science and policy uncertainties, individual action is better
suited to combating obesity than is government action. 59 Arguably, Epstein
here contradicts one of libertarianism's tenets, namely, that the more
60
information consumers have, the better. It apper that his basic opposition to
government intervention wins out over favoring access to information.
On the other hand, some of those who are usually Epstein's ideological
allies support at least limited governmental intervention to combat obesity.
Perhaps the most prominent of these allies is Judge Richard Posner, who
acknowledges that criticism of the regulation as paternalistic and unnecessary is
legitimate but also inconclusive. 6 1 Posner says that the law would be
paternalistic if obesity caused no harm to anyone other than the obese, but
posits that obesity does impose negative externalities.6
A government
informational program that reduced obesity could help to reduce these
externalities, especially if aimed at children, because poor eating habits often

develop at young ages.63 Posner' s hope for the New York regulation is that the
shock of seeing calorie values posted on menu boards may scare people into
eating fewer calories, thus reducing obesity rates and possibly generating
greater happiness.64 Posner is not sure of the ultimate effect of the ordinance,
much of the American increase in obesity can be blamed on the growth in the number of fastfood and ftill-service restaurants since 1980).
58. See id at 1375-85 (giving possible policies to combat obesity and discussing pros and
cons of each approach).
59. See id. at 13 85 ("Individually, not collectively, seems the better approach. Better a bit
of self-control than a ton of state initiatives.... [A] dose of individual self-control is the only
viable option.").
60. See Posner, supra note 8 (favoring the New York regulation not necessarily because it
provides greater information to consumers, but because it will provide information on the
efficacy of public interventions in changing life styles).
61. See id (compiling a list of objections to New York's ordinance).
62. See id (asserting that the obese affect others by consuming more medical resources
subsidized by the public). However, Posner also notes that obesity may decrease health care
costs to the extent that the obese die at younger ages. Id
63. See id (positing that while the result could be lowering of obesity rates, government
efforts to educate citizens about obesity have been ineffective in the past). Posner also says that
children's choices to eat bad food are "not [] authentic choice[s], to which society need defer."

Id
64.

See id (discussing chain of events under which New York City's regulation could
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but he favors it because "it will yield valuable information about the effects of
public interventions designed to alter life styles.",65 Although he does not
appear overly enthusiastic about New York's chances at fighting obesity with
this regulation, Posner is much more supportive than Epstein. Scholars,
therefore, do not necessarily divide on neat ideological grounds on this issue;
even thinkers coming from the same general area of the ideological spectrum
disagree on such measures.
B. Legal Challenges
While philosophical debates over the efficacy of laws to combat obesity
are interesting, the ultimate purpose here is to discuss the legal grounds for
challenging these regulations. If regulations such as New York's are
unconstitutional or otherwise illegal, philosophical debates on the subject will
have little relevance in the real world. In NYSRA J,66 NYSRA challenged New
York's first version of Regulation 81.50 on two grounds: First, that it was
preempted by federal legislation, and second, that the regulatory scheme
violated its members' First Amendment right to freedom of speech .6 ' The
preemption claim was predicated primarily on the structure of the regulation,
which required restaurants that already disclosed nutritional information to post
that information on their menus in a prominent fashion.6 While the court
recognized New York City's authority to mandate the disclosure of nutrition
infor tion6 9 it ruled that Regulation 81.50 was preempted by federal law.7
lead to a reduction in obesity).
6 5. Id
66. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA 1), 509 F. Supp. 2d
351. 361-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (striking down first version of the Board of Health's calorie
posting requirement as preempted by federal law). In NYSRA I, the state restaurant association
challenged 81.50 on the grounds that it was preempted by NLEA and that it was a violation of
the association members' free speech rights under the First Amendment. Id at 352. Both the
association and the city sought summary judgment on the preemption claim, which the court
deemed appropriate. Id. at 354. The court ultimately ruled that the regulation was preempted
by NLEA, and therefore reserved its decision on the First Amendment issues for a later date. Id.
at 363.
67. See id at 352 (discussing bases for NYSRA's lawsuit).
68. Id at 353.
69. See id at 361 ("New York City, then, would appear to be free to require restaurants to
provide nutrition information.").
70. See id at 363 (stating that New York City's regulation was preempted by NLEA
because of its voluntary aspect). Interestingly, Judge Richard Hollowell's opinion provided
something of a roadmap for New York to enact a version of Regulation 81.50 that would
comply with NLEA-he indicated that a regulation requiring all restaurants to provide
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In essence, the court struck down the nutrition labeling mandates because the
federal law occupied the field-any time that restaurants wanted to make
optional claims and disclosures about their foods, federal law applied, and state
or municipal law could not be inconsistent with federal law. 7' Federal law, in
this case, allows restaurants that voluntarily disclose nutrition information to
make that information available in a variety of ways.7 To the extent that
Regulation 81.50 required disclosures of voluntarily disseminated nutrition
information in more specific formats, it was inconsistent with federal law and,
therefore, preempted.7 Importantly, the court declined to rule on the First
Amendment challenges brought forward by NYSRA.7
NYSRA I, however, was not the final word on New York's attempts to
mandate disclosure of nutrition information by restaurants. Instead, the city
enacted a new version of Regulation 81.50, which applied not to restaurants
that already voluntarily disclosed nutrition information, but rather to all
restaurants with fifteen or more outlets nationally. 75 NYSRA again challenged
the regulation, in another case styled as New York State RestaurantAss'n v.
New York City Board of Health (NYSRA JJ).76 This time, the court rejected
nutritional information would not be preempted. Id
71. See id at 362 ("Section 343- l(a)(5) [of NLEA], on the other hand, preempts any state
regulation of nutrient content claims, including claims made by restaurants, that 'is not identical
to the requirement[s] of section 403(r)."').
72. See id. ("Under 21 C.F.R. § 10 1.10, a restaurant that makes a claim is allowed to
publish the nutrient amount that is the basis for the claim 'in various forms, including those
provided in § 101.45 [shelf labels, signs, posters, brochures, notebooks, or leaflets] and other
reasonable means."').
73. See id. (stating that, as drafted, Regulation 81.50 contains obligations not contained in
federal law).
74. See id. at 363 ("Having found the subject regulation preempted, the Court need not
and does not address the parties' First Amendment arguments.").

75.

See N.Y. State

Rest. Ass'n

v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA Hi), No. 08 Civ.

1000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at * 1 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,2008) (describing revised version
of Regulation 81.50, which critically provides that all food service establishments within the
City of New York that are part of a chain containing fifteen or more locations nationwide must
provide nutritional information, regardless of whether they otherwise voluntarily made the
information available).
76. See id. at * 1 (deciding that second version of New York City regulation survived both
a federal preemption challenge and a First Amendment challenge). Once again, NYSRA
challenged the regulation on two grounds: First, that it was preempted by federal law, and
second, that it violated its members' rights to free speech under the First Amendment. Id. This
time, the court rejected NYSRA's preemption claim, as the new version of the regulation did not
deal with voluntary disclosure of nutrition information, but instead mandated disclosure of
nutrition information by all restaurants of a certain size, regardless of whether they already
disclosed the information. Id. at *5. Because the court rejected the preemption claim, it was
forced to decide on NYSRA's First Amendment claims. Id. at *6-12. The parties and the court
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NYSRA's preemption challenge, saying that the city had cured that defect by
making the calorie disclosure mandatory for all restaurants of a certain type and
not dependent on already disclosing nutritional information.7
Thus, the
possibility of success for the restaurants' second challenge to Regulation 81.50
rested squarely on NYSRA's ability to convince the court that a First
Amendment violation had occurred.
NYSRA asserted that the regulation unconstitutionally compelled speech
by its members.7 NYSRA and the city, however, agreed that the regulation
concerned only commercial speech, which is given less protection than other
forms of speech; the court agreed .79 The court stated that when information to
be disclosed is factual and uncontroversial, the state needs only to demonstrate
a rational relationship between the speech and its interest in preventing
consumer deception .8 Because the court imposed the low rational relationship
hurdle for the city to clear, NYSRA never really had a chance to prevail on its
First Amendment argument. Indeed, the court went on to conclude that the city
had offered evidence that some consumers would eat fewer calories because of
the information provided pursuant to the regulation, thereby lessening the rates
of obesity in the city.8 '1 The court's ultimate decision was that "Regulation
81.50 is an entirely reasonable approach to the City's goal of reducing

obesity."8

2

agreed that any speech restriction applied to commercial speech in this case, which the court
asserted was due less constitutional protection than other forms of speech. Id at *6. NYSRA
argued specifically that the regulation violated its members' rights to be free from compelled
speech. Id. The court, however, distinguished restrictions on commercial speech from
commercial disclosure requirements; it said the New York regulation fell into the latter
category. Id. at *7-..9 When considering commercial disclosure requirements, the court noted
that regulations requiring the disclosure of factual and uncontroversial commercial information
"need only be 'reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers. "'
Id. at *6 (citing Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2001)). The court
ultimately ruled that because the regulation required the disclosure of only the "factual and
uncontroversial" calorie information, it was not compelled speech. Id. at *9. After coming to
that conclusion, the court decided that there was a reasonable relationship between requiring
disclosure of calorie information and the city's goal of reducing obesity. Id. at *12. As such,
the court rejected NYSRA's First Amendment challenge to New York's regulation. Id. at * 13.
77. See id at *5 (stating that the new regulation is saved from preemption by express
provisions of the NLEA).
78. See id at *6 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977), for the
proposition that compelled speech can be unconstitutional).
79. See id. (collecting cases in support of proposition that commercial speech is due less
protection than other forms of speech).
80. Id (citing Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2001)).
81. See id. at * 12 (outlining evidence of reasonable relationship between speech
compelled by regulation and reduction in obesity rates).
82. Id
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The district court's opinion was recently affirmed by the Second Circuit. 83
The panel deciding the case said the district court's decision was "compelled by
this Circuit's law, which rested on our interpretation of Supreme Court
precedent."84 The Second Circuit's law, in turn, was that "rules 'mandating
that commercial actors disclose commercial information' are subject to the
rational basis test." 85
The court explained that National Electrical
ManufacturersAss'n v. Sorrel8 6 controlled, thereby mandating this rational
basis review.8 The court also disposed of Second Circuit precedent more
favorable to NYSRA 8, finding that it would apply only when a state's interest
was merely the satisfaction of consumer curiosity. 89 Once the court had found
that the rational basis test applied, it quickly disposed of NYSRA's challenge to
90
the disclosure law.
At both the district court and the circuit court levels, the standard of
review chosen was fatal to NYSRA's chances of overturning New York City's
regulation. Rational basis review almost always results in government
regulations being upheld because the threshold under that test is so low. The
pertinent question is whether the Supreme Court or other appellate courts
would apply a more stringent test to New York's regulation.
C. Restrictions on CommercialSpeech
Precedent indicates that future reviewing courts might apply more
stringent standards in reviewing New York's regulation and other similar
regulations. The district court in NYSRA II mentioned, but refuised to apply,
83. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA 111), 556 F.3d 114,
117-18 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding the Southern District's rulings that Regulation 81.50 was not
preempted by federal statute and that the restaurants' First Amendment rights were not violated
by the regulation).
84. Id at 132.
85. Id (citing Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2001)).
86. Nat'l Elec. Mfr-s. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F. 3d 104, 115-16 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that
a Vermont statute requiring labeling of products containing mercury did not violate
manufacturers' free speech rights).
87. See NYSR4 111, 556 F.3d at 132-36 (rejecting NYSRA's challenge to Sorrell and
finding that compelled disclosure regimes are subject to rational basis review).
88. See id. at 134 (explaining that InternationalDairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, which
allowed for a heightened standard of review, was not applicable because it had been limited to
its facts by Sorrell).
89. Id
90. See id. at 136 ("Regulation 81.50's calorie disclosure rules are clearly reasonably
related to its goal of reducing obesity.").
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CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York, 9' which it said "is used to evaluate the constitutionality of measures that
restrict commercial speech."0 2 The four-prong test announced in that case
"irequires a court to consider (1) whether the regulated expression concerns
lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted; and (4) whether the regulation is more extensive
than is necessary to advance that interest."03 If the speech involves illegal
activity or is misleading, the regulation will be upheld, but if the speech neither
is misleading nor concerns illegal activity, courts must consider the other

prongs of the

test. 94

If the government interest asserted is not substantial,

however, or if the regulation either does not directly advance the government
interest or is more extensive than necessary, the regulation will be struck
down. 9 5 Thus, if NYSRA had been able to convince the district court or the
Second Circuit that Regulation 81.50 constituted a restrictionon commercial
speech, as opposed to a compelled disclosure of factual and noncontroversial
information, the court would have applied a much stricter standard of review.9
But are there any grounds to believe that any court would find the regulation to
be a restriction on commercial speech, or in any other way violative of
restaurants' free speech rights?
While the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit appear to
be the only courts that have adjudicated challenges to calorie posting
requirements thus far, precedent on similar matters indicates that the answer to
whether New York's calorie disclosure requirements violate commercial free
speech law is closer than the NYSRA II court claimed. One of the seminal cases
on commercial speech is Virginia State BoardofPharnacyv. Virginia Citizens
91. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980) (ruling that commercial speech is entitled to constitutional protections).
92. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA fl), No. 08 Civ.
1000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008).
93. Id. at *7 n.8 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
94. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 ("Consequently, there can be no constitutional
objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public
about lawful activity.").
95. See id at 564 (stating that failure to comply with final three prongs of test will lead to
government regulations being struck down).
96. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA 111), 556 F.3d 114, 118
(2d Cir. 2009) (" [A] lthough the restaurants are protected by the Constitution when they engage
in commercial speech, the First Amendment is not violated ... [when] the law in question
mandates a simple factual disclosure of caloric information and is reasonably related to New
York City's goals of combating obesity.").
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Consumer Council Inc., 97 in which the Supreme Court concluded that
commercial speech can receive First Amendment protections because it can
help further the goal of a fully informed citizenry. 98 Since that case, the Court
has decided a number of commercial free speech cases, perhaps most
prominently CentralHudson. Crucially, however, the district court and Second
Circuit refused to apply the CentralHudson test, saying that it did not apply to
factual commercial disclosure requirements."9 Instead of CentralHudson, the
courts applied National Electrical Manufacturers' Ass n v. Sorrell'00 and
0 1 In Sorrell, the Second Circuit
Zauderer v. Office of DisciplinaryCounsel.'1
upheld against First Amendment challenge a Vermont statute that required
manufacturers to place labels on their products warning consumers that the
products contained mercury and should thus be disposed of as hazardous
waste.102 The court's reasoning was that commercial speech is less protected
97. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976) (deciding that commercial speech merits some First Amendment protection). In that
case, the plaintiff-appellees challenged a Virginia statute that branded as unprofessional any
advertising of prices by pharmacists. Id at 749-50. The challenge was made not by
pharmacists themselves, but rather by consumers affected by the advertising ban who claimed
that they would reap monetary benefits if the ban were lifted. Id. at 753. The crux of their claim
was that "the First Amendment entitles the user of prescription drugs to receive information that
pharmacists wish to communicate to them through advertising." Id at 754. As a preliminary
matter, the Court ruled that freedom of speech attached to both the hearer and the speaker. Id at
756. The government nonetheless contended that advertisement ofprescription drugs could be
prohibited because it was "commercial speech"-an approach that the court seemingly had
endorsed previously. Id. at 758-59. The Court, however, rejected its previous stance, asserting
that even where speech is purely in pursuit of an economic motive, it does not lack First
Amendment protection. Id at 762. While the Court kept its opinion fairly narrow, it did
conclude that a state could not "completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful
information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its
disseminators and its recipients." Id. at 773.
98. See id. at 765 ("[Elven if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an
instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free
flow of information does not serve that goal.").
99. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA 11), No. 08 Civ.
1000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008) ("In any case, the Second
Circuit made clear in Sorrell that Central Hudson is not applied to factual commercial
disclosure requirements."); NYSRA 11, 556 F.3d at 134 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting NYSRA's
argument that CentralHudson should apply).
100. See Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding a
Vermont statute that required disclosure of mercury levels on labels of products).
101. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,650-51 (1985) (upholding
Ohio Bar disciplinary rules that required attorneys to disclose in advertisements that even when
clients did not have to pay fees, they might still have to pay costs, on basis that the requirement
was reasonably related to state interest in preventing consumer deception).
102. See Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 107-08 (describing the Vermont statute at issue and nature of
challenge brought by plaintiffs).
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than other speech, and that there is a key difference between prohibitions on
speech and factual disclosure requirements. 103 Regulations mandating factual
disclosures will be upheld if they bear a rational relationship to the state's
interest in preventing consumer deception.134' Sorrell was in turn based in large
part on Zauderer,where the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
several of Ohio's bar disciplinary rules. 105 While the Court upheld Ohio's
requirement that attorneys disclose information related to contingent fees,' 06 it
struck down disciplinary rules that severely restricted the content of attorney
advertising.10 7 In NYSRA II, the district court cited Sorrell and Zauderer in a
way that made NYSRA appear to be quite similarly situated to the plaintiffs in
however, reveals that NYSRA II arguably
those cases. 18Acoeexmination,
can be distinguished from Sorrell and Zauderer.

D. Sorrell and Zauderer Versus NYSRA 11
The NYSRA II court may have erred in its application of Sorrell and
Zauderer to Regulation 81.50; the regulations at issue in those cases can be
distinguished from New York's calorie disclosure requirement, and the
reasoning in both cases arguably can be distinguished too. This subpart
considers the factual differences between Son-eli and Zauderer on the one
hand, and NYSRA II on the other. It goes on to consider the application of
Amestoy and why the Second Circuit felt the need to limit that case to its facts
in Sorrell.

See id. at 113 (stating the court's reasoning for upholding disclosure requirements).
104. See id. (stating the test for constitutionality of disclosure requirements regarding
purely factual and uncontroversial. information).
105. See Zauderer,471 U.S. at 63 1-32 (stating that appellant was charged with violating
Bar disciplinary rules against false, fraudulent advertising; against undignified advertisements;
and against recommending oneself as an attorney to a nun-lawyer who has not sought advice).
106. See id at 651 ("[Alppellant's constitutionally protected interest in not providing any
particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.").
107. See id at 644 ("The State's argument that it may apply a prophylactic rule to punish
appellant . .. is in tension with our insistence that restrictions involving commercial speech that
is not itself deceptive be narrowly crafted to serve the State's purposes." (citing Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 565, 569-71 (1980))).
108. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA fl), No. 08 Civ.
l000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *6-8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008) (discussing Sorrell and
Zaudererand concluding that, "Regulation 81.50 passes constitutional muster as long as there is
a 'rational connection' between the disclosure requirement and the City's purpose in imposing
it" (citing Nat'l Elec. Mfrs Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2001))).

103.
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1. Zauderer

The NYSRA HI court only considered the part of Zauderer that upheld
Ohio's requirement that full information be given about contingent fees.' 09
Thus, it considered only the part of that case that was most likely to lead to
upholding the regulationl.' 10 Zaudereris much more equivocal on the question
of commercial free speech than its characterization in NIYSRA IIwould lead that
opinion's reader to believe."' The court's conclusion appears to rest on the
simple proposition that because the laws and regulations discussed in Sorrell
and Zauderercompelled disclosure of factual and uncontroversial information
(like Regulation 81.50), a challenge to Regulation 81.50 should be analyzed
under an identical framework." 2 Indeed, the court asserted that "both
Regulation 81.50 and the Vermont statute at issue in Sorell attempt to ...
13
provid[e] consumers with 'complete and accurate commercial information. ""
In Zauderer,the state of Ohio had convicted an attorney of violating its rules
that mandated a disclosure that clients would be responsible for costs in
contingent-fee cases, even if they did not have to pay fees if the case was
lost."14

The Court based its ruling in part on Ohio's having "attempted only to

prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising, and its prescription
[took] the form of a requirement that appellant include in his advertising purely
factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which his
services will be available. "" The difference between Zaudererand NYSRA HI
is readily apparent: In Zauderer,the state's interest was justified as a measure
to prevent consumer deception.'1 That was not the case in NYSRA IT.
109. See id at *7 (applying Zaudererto facts of NIYSRA HI but failing to discuss a portion
of case that struck down some of Ohio's disciplinary rules).
110. See id ("[Tihe Court held that 'an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long
as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception
of consumers."').
Ill1. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 645 (1985)
(concluding that when appellant's advertisements regarding subject of potential litigation were
completely accurate, state had no constitutional interest in restricting commercial speech).
112. See NYSRA HI, 2008 WL 175245 5, at *8 ("Like the requirement that a manufacturer
disclose that its products contain mercury, Regulation 81.50 compels only the disclosure of
'purely factual and uncontroversial' commercial information-the calorie content of restaurant
menu items.").
113. Id. (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 766 (1993)).
114. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650.
115. Id
116. See id. at 651 ("'[Wiaing[s] or disclaimer[s] mih be appropriately required ... in
order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception."' (quoting In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982))).
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2. Sorrell

The NYSRA II court may have done the same thing with Sorrellthat it did
with Zauderer-thatis to say, it may have overlooked the factual circumstances
of the case to make it more easily comparable to the situation it confronted."' 7
Sorrell involved the Second Circuit's upholding a Vermont statute that required
companies to label their products that contained mercury so that consumers
would know the products should be disposed of as hazardous waste.' 18 What
the NYSRA II court failed to address fully is simply that there is an inherent
difference between laws mandating disclosure of nutritional facts on the one
hand, and the presence of mercury in products on the other." 9 Regardless,
Sorrell insists that prevention of consumer deception is not the only reason to
compel commercial speech,12 0 and also notes that analyzing compelled
disclosure regimes under a higher scrutiny standard could potentially
undermine a number of federal regulations that rely on the compelled
disclosure of information.12 1 Thus, it appears that the Sorrell court was not as
concerned with protecting free speech rights as it was with not upsetting the
judicial apple cart.
3. Differentiating Sorrell and Zaudererfrom NYSRA II
To a layman, legal fees such as those at issue in Zauderer can be
inherently confusing, especially when an advertisement arguably implies that
22
clients will not be liable for any legal costs, when they in fact may be.'1
Similarly, the average consumer might simply assume that there was no
117. See Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing
Vermont statute that compelled companies to label products containing mercury).
118. See id. ('[The statute] requires manufacturers of some mercury-containing products to
label their products and packaging to inform consumers that the products contain mercury and,
on disposal, should be recycled or disposed of as hazardous waste.").
119. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA 11), No. 08 Civ.
1000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *6-8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,2008) (applying Sorrellto the facts
of the case, but not addressing differences in what was regulated by the laws at issue in that case
and Regulation 81.50).
120. See Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 115 (asserting that reasonable-relationship rule applies to
commercial disclosure statutes even when they are not intended to prevent consumer deception).
121. See id at 116 (enumerating regulatory schemes that could be upset, including tobacco
labeling, securities disclosures, and numerous others).
122. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,650 (1985) (stating that
advertisement that said clients would not be liable for legal fees, but failed to disclose they
might be liable for litigation costs, was misleading).
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mercury in a product he bought, so the disclosure that there is mercury in that
product helps to advance the state's interest in promoting its citizens' health by
preventing unwitting mercury poisonings.12 3 When consumers buy food,
however, they know that they are getting a product that contains calories. As
Professor Epstein puts it, "[A] skull and crossbones would be out of place in
this environment-the [food] products in question are not poisons .... '2
Unlike in the context of unwittingly purchasing a product containing mercury,
or retaining a lawyer with the expectation of not paying fees only to find
yourself saddled with expensive legal costs, there is nothing inherently
misleading to most consumers about buying food.
4. Amestoy
Another Second Circuit case dealing with restrictions on commercial
speech that came out on the opposite side of Zauderer and Sorrell is
InternationalDairyFoods Ass'n v. Amestoy. 21 5 In A mestoy, the Second Circuit
confronted a Vermont statute that required dairy producers to disclose the
presence of recombinant Bovine Sematotropin (rBST) in their products at the
point of sale.'126 The dairy producers challenged the statute on the grounds that
it "(1) infringed their protected rights under the First Amendment to the
Constitution and (2) violated the Constitution's Commerce Clause."127 The
court determined that "[tlhe wrong done by the labeling law to the dairy
manufacturers' constitutional right not to speak is a serious one that was not
given proper weight by the district court."' 28 The parties in Amestoy disagreed
as to whether the speech at issue was commercial in nature,129 but the court
123. See Nat'l Elec. Mfr's Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[The
statute] is inextricably intertwined with the goal of increasing consumer awareness of the
presence of mercury in a variety of products.").
124. Epstein, supra note 52, at 1377.
125. Int'I Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a
Vermont statute requiring disclosure of hormone in dairy products was an unconstitutional
restriction on commercial speech because it required manufacturers to make involuntary
statements when they sold their products and because consumer concern was not a strong
enough state interest to justify this compulsion).
126. See id at 69-70 (describing Vermont's statutory labeling requirement for products
containing the hormone, including a sign in stores and a blue dot on the product itself).
127. Id at 70.
128. Idat71.
129. See id. at 71-72 (discussing Vermont's contention that speech was commercial in
nature and plaintiffs' contention that speech was not purely commercial because it forced them
to convey a message contrary to their views).
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determined that it did not need to take sides to make its decision." 0 Instead, the
court simply assumed that the statute compelled commercial speech and applied
the Central Hudson test, thereby requiring the state to show a substantial
interest for the statute to stand.13 ' The court explained that "a governmental
body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate
that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them
to a material degree."132 Ultimately, the state failed to demonstrate that its
interest in passing the legislation was substantial; the state did not claim that the
law was motivated by health concerns, but asserted that it wanted to satisfy
customers' curiosity.133 Thus, consumers' "desire [to know about rSBT-treated
products] is insufficient to permit the State of Vermont to compel the dairy

manufacturers to speak against their

Wil.3

If there is no indication of a

substantial government concern, then consumers should instead buy from
manufacturers who voluntarily disclose the information they desire. 3 3' Thus,
the court decided that "consumer curiosity alone is not a strong enough state
interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual statement in a
36
commercial context."'
5. Sorrell and Amestoy
In the Sorreli case, the Second Circuit failed to dispose of its earlier ruling
in Amestoy effectively. The key component of Amestoy is that the court found
that the CentralHudson test applied even to factual disclosure requirements for
commercial interests.137 This ruling flies in the face of the Second Circuit's
130. See id. at 72 ("[Elven assuming that the compelled disclosure is purely commercial
speech, appellants have amply demonstrated that the First Amendment is sufficiently implicated
to cause irreparable harm.").
131. See id. at 72-73 (explaining and applying the CentralHudson test and finding that
Vermont's justification for the statute-satisfying strong consumer curiosity-was not a
substantial interest).
132. Id. at 73 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
133. See id. (explaining district court findings that Vermont's interest was not in health or
safety, but merely strong consumer interest and the public's right to know).
134. Jdat 74.
135. See id. ("Absent, however, some indication that this information bears on a ...
sufficiently substantial governmental concern, the manufacturers cannot be compelled to
disclose it. Instead, those consumers interested in such information should exercise the power
of their purses by buying products from manufacturers who voluntarily reveal it.").
136. Id. (internal citations omitted).
137. See id. at 71 ("If, however, as Vermont maintains, its labeling law compels appellants
to engage in purely commercial speech, the statute must meet a less rigorous test." (citing Cent.
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finding in Sorrell, where it determined that "[tlhe Amendment is satisfied,
therefore, by a rational connection between the purpose of a commercial
disclosure requirement and the means employed to realize that purpose.t 1038O
course, Sorrell was decided after A mestoy, so the Sorrell court had to dispose
of Amestoy before making its ruling.139 In deciding that Vermont's mercury
disclosure statute should be evaluated under the Zauderer reasonablerelationship standard14 0 rather than the Central Hudson standard, the court
made the distinction that Vermont's interest in regulating mercury was
substantial,'14 ' while its interest in requiring disclosure of bovine hormone use
was merely to satisfy consumer curiosity. 12The court made a compelling case
that Vermont had a substantial interest in mercury labeling,143 but essentially
failed to address the conflict with Amestoy. The court's reasoning lends itself
to the conclusion that, if the state has a substantial interest in compelling
factual, accurate commercial speech, the CentralHudson test will not apply.'14
Because the substantiality of the state's interest is one prong of the Central
Hudson test,145 the Sorrell court's conclusion is inconsistent with Central

Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Conim'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980))).
138. Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001).
139. See id. (explaining that CentralHudson does not supply the correct standard ofreview
in this case).
140. See id. ("We therefore find that [the challenged Vermont statute] is governed by the
reasonable-relationship rule in Zauderer.").
14 1. See id. at 115 n.6 (distinguishing Amestoy on the basis that it dealt only with cases
where state interest was in satisfying consumer curiosity, essentially limiting the case to its
facts). The court stated:
[O]ur decision [in Amestoyl was expressly limited to cases in which a state
disclosure requirement is supported by no interest other than the gratification of
'consumer curiosity.' The disclosure statute at issue here, however, is based on
Vermont's substantial interest in protecting human health and the environment
from mercury poisoning. Moreover, because our decision in [Amestoy] was
predicated on the state's inability to identify a sufficient legitimate state interest, we
did not reach the proper relationship between a disclosure regulation's means and
its ends, the issue we face here.
Id. (citations omitted).
142. Id.
143. See id at 115 ("Vermont's interest in protecting human health and the environment
from mercury poisoning is a legitimate and significant public goal.").
144. See id at 115 n.6 (explaining rationale for applying Zauderer rather than Central
Hudson); see also supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text (discussing more fuilly the court's
rationale for distinguishing Amestoy).
145. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980) ("The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on
commercial speech."); Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cur. 1996)
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Hudson and Amestoy to the extent it says that the CentralHudson test does not
need to be applied when there is a substantial state interest. 14 This is
problematic because, while one of the CentralHudson test's prongs requires a
substantial state interest, 147 the test ultimately requires the regulation to satisfy
three more prongs. Thus, the Sorrell court's rationale has the potential to shortcircuit the CentralHudson test.
6. Sorrell and Amestoy in NYSRA 11
At base, both Sorrell and Amestoy involve Vermont statutes designed to
improve consumer awareness. 148 And yet, the Second Circuit applied radically
different tests to determine the validity of those statutes under the First
Amendment.14 9 This distinction was critical in NYSRA II because the Southern
District cited Sorrell as authority for both its opinion in general and for its
decision to ignore Amestoy. 150 While Amestoy does state that "mere consumer
concern is not, in itself, a substantial interest,"'15 1 the case does not limit itself to
situations of mere consumer concern.112 Instead, the court said that "[tlhese
interests [satisfying consumer curiosity] are insufficient to justify compromising
("Under Central Hudson, we must detemie... whether the government's interest is
substantial .. .. )
146. See Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 n.6 (2d Cir. 2001)
(expressing opinion that CentralHudson does not apply because substantial state interest is at
stake).
147. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (explaining CentralHudson's substantialinterest prong).
148. See Sorrel, 272 F.3d at 107 (explaining Vermont mercury-labeling statute); Amestoy,
92 F.3d at 69 (explaining Vermont bovine hormone-labeling statute).
149. See supranotes 120-36 and accompanying text (detailing tests used in Amestoy and
Sorrel! and the Second Circuit's rationales for applying them).
150. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Rd. of Health (NYSRA 11), No. 08 Civ. 1000
(RJ}I), 2008 WL 1752455, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008) (citing Sorrell for proposition that
Second Circuit had rejected CentralHudson in compelled disclosure cases and for rejection of
Amestoy). The court stated:
[Tihe Second Circuit made clear in Sorrell that Central Hudson is not applied to
factual commercial disclosure requirements. The court in Sorrell also explained
that the use of the Central Hudson test [in Amestoyl ... was "expressly limited to
cases in which a state disclosure requirement is supported by no interest other than
the gratification of 'consumer curiosity."'
Id. (citing Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 113-14, 115 n.6).
15 1. Int'l Dairy Farmers Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 73 n.lI (2d Cir. 1996).
152. See id at 73 ("In our view, Vermont has failed to establish the second prong of the
CentralHudson test, namely that its interest is substantial.").
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protected constitutional rights."15 3 The Second Circuit's ruling in Amestoy is
thus in conflict with its ruling in Sorrell. The Sorrel! court distinguished
Amestoy, but the panel's rationale for doing so was shaky. 5 Why would the
Sorrell court not want to apply CentralHudson? After all, a cursory glance at
the case reveals that the statute at issue might pass the CentralHudson tes.5
While the Vermont statute clearly regulates a lawful activity and speech that is
not misleading, 516 there is a very good chance that the government's interest is
substantial, satisfying Central Hudson's second prong; the Second Circuit
called the state's interest "significant."15 7 The final two prongs of the Central
Hudson test are more subjective, and thus more susceptible to interpretation by
judges; they require regulations of commercial speech to advance directly the
state interest involved and to be as narrow as possible to serve the state's
interest.15 8 While the district court in Sorrell found that the Vermont statute
failed the CentralHudson test,'159 Supreme Court precedent indicates that the
district court in Sorrel! may have applied Central Hudson too harshly, thus
leaving open the possibility that if the Second Circuit had applied that test, it
might have found that Vermont's law directly advanced the state's interest and
was not too broad.160 Assuming that to be the case, why did the Second Circuit
feel the need to limit Amestoy in Sorrel!, thereby making it much more difficult
to strike down commercial disclosure requirements?

153.
154.

Id.
See supranotes 139-42 and accompanying text (describing Second Circuit's rationale
for distinguishing Amiestoy).
155. See Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Vermont's
interest in protecting human health and the environment from mercury poisoning is a legitimate
and significantpublic goal." (emphasis added)).
156. See id. at 107 n. 1 (laying out disclosure regulations under Vermont's mercurylabeling statute, requiring labels on, inter alia, thermometers, lamps, and batteries containing
mercury); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Coinm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980) (relating that test is triggered when government seeks to curb speech that is
neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity).
157. Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 115; see also Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (stating that when
regulation concerns lawful activity or speech that is not misleading, "[t]he State must assert a
substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech").
158. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (announcing final two prongs of four-part test).
159. See Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 72 F. Supp. 2d 449, 455 (D. Vt. 1999),
vacated, 272 F.3d 104 (stating that Vermont's mercury-labeling law failed CentralHudson test
because it did not directly advance the state's interest in protecting its citizens' health by
reducing mercury emissions).
160. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,556 (2001) (stating that to satisfy
the fourth prong of the CentralHudson test, a regulation does not need to be the least restrictive
means, but that there need only be a reasonable fit between means and ends).
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7. Why are Sorrell and Amestoy Different?

The short answer may be that two different panels of judges decided the
two cases. Judges Altimari, McLaughlin, and Leval decided Amestoy,16 1while
62
Chief Judge Walker and Judges Pooler and Sotomayor decided Sorrel. '
Whatever the reason for the different standards in the two cases, there is
undoubtedly confusion within the Second Circuit about the appropriate
standard to apply when the government compels commercial speech. Given
this confusion, the Southern District's assertion that "the Second Circuit made
clear in Sorrell that Central Hudson is not applied to factual commercial
disclosure requirements" 163 may not prove to be as ironclad a statement of
judicial precedent as the court believed at the time.
But the underlying question of why the panel in Sorrel! felt compelled not
to apply the CentralHudson test still stands. The court indicated that part of its
motivation was to ensure that long-standing governmental regulatory schemes
would stand. The court stated, "Finally, we note the potentially wide-ranging
implications of NEMA's First Amendment complaint. Innumerable federal and
state regulatory programs require the disclosure of product and other
commercial information." 164 Some scholars have agreed, arguing that it would
be folly to upset the regulatory regimes compelling commercial speech that
arguably stand on Supreme Court precedent.' 65 If concern for stability in the
law is what motivated the Second Circuit in Sorrell, the court may have made a
mistake because recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated more and more
sympathy for commercial free speech protection.16 6 Ifthe Supreme Court trend
161. See Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996).
162. See Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2001).
163. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA fl), No. 08 Civ.
I1000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008).
164. Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 116. The court continued, stating: "To hold that the Vermont
statute is insufficiently related to the state's interest in reducing mercury pollution would expose
these long-established programs to searching scrutiny by unelected courts. Such a result is
neither wise nor constitutionally required." Id.
165. See, e.g., Robert Post, TransparentandEfficient Markets: Compelled Commercial
Speech and Coerced CommercialAssociation in United Foods, Zauderer, andAbood, 40 VA.
U. L. Rnv. 555, 557 (2006) (arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions on commercial speech
evidence a lack of thought on the Supreme Court's part on the upheaval and displacements that
could occur within regulatory schemes because of change from past decisions).
166. See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405,415-16 (2001) (stating
that governmental scheme to force mushroom producers to pay into common fund for
advertising could not survive First Amendment scrutiny because mushroom growers were forced
to subsidize a message with which they did not agree). Post argues that United Foods indicates
a dangerous shift toward decreasing government's ability to restrict commercial speech. Post,
supra note 165, at 557.
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really is toward allowing more freedom of commercial speech,16 1 the Second
Circuit's attempt to provide some sort of stability in the law would be a losing
battle. If that is the case, the Second Circuit accomplished very little by
distinguishing Amestoy when it decided Sorrell. Additionally, as argued later
in this Note, more searching scrutiny might not result in critical existing
regulations being overturned so much as it would lead to the fine-tuning of new

regulations.' 6

8

If overlooking Amestoy was a mistake, it does not necessarily follow that
the Sorrell court should have struck down Vermont's mercury disclosure
statute.'169 If the Sorrell court had not distinguished Amestoy, and had instead
kept the CentralHudson test for compelled commercial speech in the Second
Circuit, the Southern District might have applied a very different analytical
framework in NYSRA4 IT. What would happen if another court applied the
Central Hudson analysis to Regulation 81.50 or to some similar disclosure
requirement? Part IV studies that question.
E. Zauderer and Central Hudson:~ Imperfect Fitsfor Regulation 81.50
Before moving to an analysis of New York's disclosure regime under the
Central Hudson test, it is important to note that neither Zauderernor Central
Hudson provides a fully appropriate analytical fr-amework. Although the
Southern District of New York may have erred in applying the Zauderer
standard to Regulation 81.50, it does not necessarily follow that it should have
applied the Central Hudson analysis. Both analytical frameworks are
uncomfortable fits for the factual situation facing NYSRA. Zauderer allowed
the state to require "that [advertisers] include in [their] advertising purely
factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which [their]
services will be available."170
It went on to state that "appellant's
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual
information in his advertising is minimal"17 1 At that point, the NYSRA4 H
167. See Post, supra note 165, at 557 (arguing that United Foods represents a dangerous
step toward allowing more freedom of commercial speech than had previously been the case).
168. See infra Part IV.D (arguing that carefulfly crafted regulations would survive stricter
scrutiny); see also supra note 160 and accompanying text (stating that the statute at issue in
Sorrell might survive the Central Hudson test).
169. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (arguing that although Second Circuit
declined to apply the Central Hudson test in Sorrell, the statute at issue might have survived the
Central Hudson inquiry).
170. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
17 1. Id.
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court's contention that Zauderer supplied the applicable standard for review
looks justified. 172 A further examination of Zauderer, however, shows the
Southern District's application to be more problematic. The Court's reasoning
rested, in part, on the fact that disclosures might be used to "dissipate the
possibility of consumer confusion or deception."173 Additionally, the Court
explicitly stated that some disclosure requirements might offend the First
Amendment if unduly burdensome,174 and held that "an advertiser's rights are
adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related
to the State's interest in preventing deception ofconsumers." 7 1 The New York
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene did not promulgate
Regulation 81.50 to prevent consumer deception, but instead did so to help
raise awareness of calories and lower obesity levels.176 Because New York
City's purpose in promulgating Regulation 81.50 was not to prevent consumer
deception, it fits uncomfortably within Zauderer's framework.
Similarly, Regulation 81.50 fits imperfectly within CentralHudson. That
decision was based, in part, on the Court's belief that "[c]ommercial expression
not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers
and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of
information."17 7
Given this foundation, Central Hudson is also an
uncomfortable analytical framework for Regulation 81.50 because, rather than
restricting the flow of information, the regulation seeks to insureafullerflow of
information to society. 18In
the past, the Supreme Court has rationalized
protecting commercial speech on the basis that society has an interest in full
and free flow of information, which is a key component of what
172.

See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA 1R), No. 08 Civ

1000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,2008) (citing Zaudererfor applicable
standard of review in commercial disclosure cases).
173. Zauderer,471 U.S. at 651.
174. See id ("We do not suggest that disclosure requirements do not implicate the
advertiser's First Amendment rights at all. We recognize that unjustified or unduly burdensome
disclosure requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial
speech. ").
175. Id (emphasis added).
176. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Rd. of Health (NYSRA 1), 509 F. Supp. 2d
351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing "obesity epidemic" as New York's reason for passing
Regulation 81.50).
177. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n ofN.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 56162 (1980); see also Va. State Rd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 764 (1976) ("Generalizing, society also may have a strong interest in the free flow of
commercial information.").
178. See NYSRA 1, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 353-54 (outlining Regulation 81.50's various
provisions designed to give more information to the public).
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Regulation 81.50 seeks to accomplish.17 9 Because this free flow of information
rationale has been a key component of past cases protective of commercial free
speech, it is understandable that the NYSRA II court refused to apply Central
Hudson.18 0 As explained above, however, the court's decision to apply
Zauderer was also flawed.'18 ' Thus, the court was left with a choice between
two standards, neither of which was perfectly on point. Given the reasoning
and facts behind Zauderer and CentralHudson, the court should have chosen
to apply the latter, if only because the government should have to show why it
should be allowed to burden First Amendment rights.18 2 This reasonable
relationship standard of review is simply not a high enough bar to force
government to demonstrate why it should be allowed to force speech, and as
such it should be viewed with suspicion and used sparingly.' 83 The contention
that CentralHudson should apply is buttressed by Amestoy, which is still good
law despite its rough treatment in Sorrell.18
IV Applying Central Hudson to Regulation 81.50
If the Second Circuit panel in Sorrell was wrong, and the four-pronged
Central Hudson analysis should be applied to Regulation 81.50, what is the
likely result? The regulation at issue in CentralHudson was an order of the
New York Public Service Commission that commanded utilities to cease
advertising that promoted the use of electricity.18 5 The Commission issued the
order because of a fuel shortage that led to fears of insufficient electricity
179. See Va. State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764-65 ("Generalizing, society also may
have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information.... [Elven if the First
Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisiomkng ....
we could not say that the free flow of information does not serve that goal.").
180. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA 11), No. 08 Civ.
I000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,2008) (explaining court's decision not
to apply CentralHudson, including citation to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy).
181. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text (explaining why Zaudererfr-amework
is ill-suited to legally analyze Regulation § 81.50).
182. See Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the FirstAmendment: A Casefor
Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71

Thx. L. REv.

777, 780 (1993) ("Commercial

speech, as speech, should presumptively enter the debate with full First Amendment
protection.").
183. See id (arguing that, in the advertising context, the case for even intermediate
review-as opposed to strict scrutiny-is tenuous).
184. See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text (explaining why Sorrell is applicable
law in the commercial free speech context).
185. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
558-60 (1980) (describing Public Service Commission's order).
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supplies, then continued the order after the crisis had passed, saying that
promoting electricity use ran counter to the official national policy of
conservation. 18 6 The Court acknowledged that "[t]he Constiution .. . accords a
lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression,"' 87 but still struck down the order, rationalizing its decision on the
grounds that the consumer should have the greatest possible amount of
information. 188 The Court's four-prong test for the acceptability of restrictions
on commercial speech 189 allows restrictions if the speech is misleading or
concerns illegal activity.190 Assuming that the speech is neither misleading nor
encourages illegal activity, the state must have a substantial interest to be
advanced by restricting the speech.' 9' The restriction must also directly
advance the state's interest,192 and cannot be overbroad.193 Since the Supreme
Court decided CentralHudson in 1980, both it and numerous circuits have had
the chance to apply its framework to various fact patterns. In general, the
misleading nature and legality of speech are not at issue in commercial free
speech cases.' 9 4 Thus, the most common disputes in commercial free speech
cases are over whether restrictions directly advance the state's interests and
whether they are overbroad.'
186. See id. at 559 (describing Commission's findings on fuel supplies and process that led
to continued effectiveness of order).
187. Id. at 562-63.
188. See id at 561-62 ("Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of
the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible
dissemination of information.").
189. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (recounting four-part test of Central
Hudson).
190. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (1980) ("If the communication is neither
misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the government's power is more circumscribed.").
191. See id, ("The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on
commercial speech.").
192. See id. ("[T]he regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or
remote support for the government's purpose.").
193. See id. ("[l]f the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited
restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.").
194. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (explaining that
the government had conceded that First Amendment rights were at stake and that manufacturers
had conceded substantiality of government's interest in preventing tobacco use by minors); see
also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 368 (2002) (stating that, in a case
involving drug advertising, neither illegality of speech nor substantiality of government's
interest were at issue).
195. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 533 ("Only the last two steps of Central
Hudson's four-part analysis are at issue here."); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484, 504-05 (1996) (scrutinizing Rhode Island's price advertising ban on alcohol not on basis
of illegality of speech or substantiality of state interest in temperance, but instead on final two
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A. PastApplications of Central Hudson

Government actors have had a good deal of trouble with the final two
prongs of the Central Hudson test.'196 Indeed, since Central Hudson, the
Supreme Court has decided: (i) that a state ban on alcohol price advertising
neither "significantly advance[d] the State's interest in promoting
temperance"197 nor "satisf[ied] the requirement that [the State's] restriction on
speech be no more extensive than necessary";198 (ii) that a ban on tobacco
advertising within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds designed to curb
youth smoking "[did] not satisfy the fourth step of the Central Hudson
analysis";' 99 and (iii) that FDA rules restricting advertising for compounded
drugs were more extensive than needed to serve its substantial interest in drug
safety, even assuming the restrictions directly advanced the interest .200 The
D.C. Circuit has headed down a similar path, ruling recently that the FDA did
not directly advance its interests in consumer health or tailor the means to the
ends when the FDA refused to allow disclosure provisions as an alternative to
complete suppression of health claims on vitamins and health supplements.2 0
Given this history, could Regulation 81.50 pass the direct advancement and
narrow tailoring prongs of the CentralHudson test?

prongs of CentralHudson).
196. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n ofN.Y., 447 U.S. 557,569
(1980) (deciding that regulation on utility's advertising partly failed direct advancement prong
and completely failed extensiveness prong); LorillardTobacco, 533 U.S. at 566 (invalidating
part of Massachusetts' tobacco advertising regulation both because it did not directly advance
state interest and was not a reasonable fit for goal of decreasing youth smoking); 44Liquormart,
517 U.S. at 505 (striking down Rhode Island alcohol price advertising ban because it would not
significantly advance state's interest in temperance).
197. 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. at 505.
198. Id at 507.
199. Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 561.
200. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002) ("[T]he FDAMA's
prohibition on advertising compounded drugs might indeed directly advance[e] the
Government's interests.... [Hiowever, the Government has failed to demonstrate that the
speech restrictions are not more extensive than is necessary to serve [those] interest[s]."
(citations and quotations omnitted)).
201. See Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 656 (D.C. Cur. 1999) ("We think that the
government's regulatory approach encounters difficulty with both [the third and fourth Central
Hudson] factors.").
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B. Applying Central Hudson to Regulation 81.50
The question is a close one. Tackling the prongs in order, perhaps the best
statement of the "direct advancement" prong of the test comes from the Supreme
Court, which says the test is only met when "the speech restriction directly and
materially advanc[es] the governmental interest.... [A] governmental body
seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the
harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a
material degree.0 02 The harm cited by New York City in passing Regulation
81.50 is the city-wide obesity trend, which the regulation hopes to combat by
giving consumers more health information so that they will choose healthier
eating options. 0 On its face, the claim that the regulation directly advances the
goal of reducing obesity is entirely reasonable. In reality, though, accepting that
claim requires acceptance of a number of assumptions . 204 Accepting New York's
rationale requires accepting that consumers would see and pay attention to calorie
information ifprovided, that consumers would change their ordering behaviors if
they had the calorie information, and that consumers would eat enough fewer
calories to impact their weight. 0 In previous commercial speech cases, courts
have not looked kindly on government regulation that purported to advance
directly a government interest, but that in fact required several inferences to show
that the regulation advanced the interest. 206 Thus, if New York's regulation were
evaluated under CentralHudson, precedent indicates that it would run afoul of
the third prong requiring that the state's regulatory scheme directly advance the
city's substantial interest in preventing obesity.

202. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (quoting Greater New
Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999)).
203. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n. v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA 11), No. 08 Civ.
l000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008) (reciting health statistics
related to obesity and foundation for New York City's contention that more nutrition
information will lead to healthier eating choices and reduced obesity).
204. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NIYSRA 1), 509 F. Supp. 2d
351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (giving New York's rationale for the regulation, including that
calories are the single most important factor in obesity and that few customers see the
information in the form currently provided).
205. See Epstein, supranote 52, at 1372 (discussing difficulty of isolating causes of weight
gain).
206. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
569 (1980) ("The link between the advertising prohibition and appellant's rate structure is, at
most, tenuous."); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505 (1996)
("[W]e cannot agree with the assertion that the price advertising ban will significantly advance
the State's interest in promoting temperance.").
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Regulation 81.50 would similarly run into significant trouble with the
fourth prong of CentralHudson's test, which asks "whether [the regulation] is
07
not more extensive than is necessary to serve [the government's] interest.0
The Supreme Court has made clear that this does not mean that governmental
bodies must choose the least restrictive means possible, but instead that there
must be a reasonable fit between means and ends. 208 While this somewhat
ambiguous standard gives courts room to maneuver, the Supreme Court has
applied it fairly restrictively, striking down a Massachusetts restriction on
tobacco advertising within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds because
"[tlhe uniformly broad sweep of the geographical limitation demonstrate[d] a
lack of tailoring., 2 09 The Court similarly struck down a Rhode Island
prohibition on advertisement of liquor prices because "[tlhe State also cannot
satisfy the requirement that its restriction on speech be no more extensive than
necessary. It is perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation that would
not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to achieve the
State's goal of promoting temperance. 2 10 With rulings like these giving force
to CentralHudson's fourth prong, Regulation 81.5 0 runs into serious trouble.
While New York City amply demonstrated that current efforts to fight obesity
are failing, 1 it has failed to address NYSRA's objection that "Regulation
81.50 requires restaurants to post caloric content on menu boards, the most
valued space in the restaurant. "212 This argument implies that NYSRA believed
that New York City could have chosen less restrictive means to accomplish its
goals, an argument it would win if precedent is any guide. As argued in Parts
IV.D.2 and V of this Note, there are several alternative regulatory arrangements
that could serve New York's interest in informing consumers and preventing
obesity as well as forcing restaurants to post calorie information on their menu
boards without similarly running afoul of First Amendment protections.

207. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
208. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) ("We have made it
clear that the least restrictive means is not the standard; instead, the case law requires a
reasonable fit between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends..., a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective." (citations and quotations
omitted)).
209. Id at 563.
210. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507.
211. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA 1), 509 F. Supp. 2d
351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (describing increase in obesity and related diseases and linking this
increase in part to poor disclosure by restaurants and low levels of awareness amongst
consumers).
212. Id at 354 (quotations omitted).
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C. A New Test? Findinga Middle Way Between Zaudererand
Central Hudson
Before coming to a conclusion, it is important to note once again that the
Central Hudson analysis is not perfectly tailored for government regulations
like New York's Regulation 81.*50.211 While CentralHudson appears to be a
better fit than Zauderer, it is aimed at regulations that suppress commercial
speech, not at regulations that compel disclosure. 1 The Supreme Court in the
past has allowed more discretion to governmental bodies when they compel
disclosures, 1 which seems appropriate given the effects on society if the
16
government's power to compel disclosure were significantly curtailed.
However, there is a clear trend within the Supreme Court to apply more
rigorous tests in commercial speech cases generally.2 17 Because of the
aforementioned trend to require a more searching inquiry when government
restricts commercial speech, it stands to reason that the Court would also
require a higher level of scrutiny for commercial disclosure requirements,
especially because there is little difference in the levels of scrutiny given these
types of speech in the individual context .2 18 Given these cross-currents, the
213. See supra notes 17 7-79 and accompanying text (discussing uncomfortable fit between
Central Hudson and Regulation 81.50).
214. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
567 (1980) ("Even in monopoly markets, the suppression of advertising reduces the information
available for consumer decisions and thereby defeats the purpose of the First Amendment.").
215. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
("[A]ppellant's constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual
information in his advertising is minimal.").
216. See Post, supra note 165, at 562-63 ("To tamper with Zauderer'sunderstanding of
compelled commercial speech is thus to trouble the foundations of pervasive and wellestablished regulatory regimes that presently govern American markets and protect American
consumers.").
217. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,554 (2001) ("Admittedly, several
Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the CentralHudson analysis and whether it
should apply in particular cases."). The Court goes on to cite cases in which no less than five
current members of the court call for revisiting Central Hudson, usually in favor of applying
strict scrutiny. Id
218. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("We begin with the proposition
that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." (citing Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943))). The proposition that commercial
disclosure requirements are entitled to a higher level of scrutiny than reasonable relationship
was directly contradicted in Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 ("But the interests at stake in this case
are not of the same order as those discussed in Wooley. ... "). However, given the Court's
gradually increasing levels of scrutiny for suppression of commercial speech, it might be willing
to reexamine its rationale from Zauderer.
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Court might be receptive to fashioning a test for certain compelled disclosure
regimes that fits into the ambiguous area between Zauderer, CentralHudson,
and the Court's possibly emerging strict scrutiny standard for commercial
speech suppression. But what would such a test look like? The options run the
gamut from the permissive reasonable relationship standard found in
Zauderer219 to the strict scrutiny standard advocated by Justice Thomas for
restrictions on commercial speech.22 Because the Court may still want to
maintain a lower threshold for compelled commercial disclosure than for
repression of commercial speech, the best approach probably comes from
taking elements from multiple tests. Given the advocacy by some Supreme
Court justices for applying strict scrutiny to suppression of commercial
speech,2 2 there is reason to believe that the Supreme Court might be willing to
apply some of the principles governing regular speech to commercial speech.
In dealing with coerced speech by individuals, the Supreme Court has said that
the state may not require an individual to disseminate an ideological message to
the public by forcing him to display it on his private property. 2 The Court
also has struck down under strict scrutiny a state law requiring passenger
vehicles to display the state motto, deciding that the state's interest in the
requirement was not compelling. 2 Of course, in Zaudererand its progeny, the
Court has made clear that compelled disclosure in the commercial context does
not merit the same protections as compelled speech by individuals, or even
suppression of commercial speech.22 So, despite movement toward protecting
commercial speech, the Supreme Court does seem unlikely to apply full strict
scrutiny to commercial disclosure requirements. Thus, the question becomes,
219. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (adopting the reasonable relationship test for
compelled disclosure regimes, thereby requiring only a reasonable relationship between the
statute and the state's interest in preventing consumer deception).
220. See Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I would subject all
of the advertising restrictions to strict scrutiny and would hold that they violate the First
Amendment.").
221. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (describing sentiment amongst some
Supreme Court justices for applying strict scrutiny to commercial speech suppression).
222. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713 ("We are thus faced with the question of whether the
State may constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an
ideological message by displaying it on his private propety.... We hold that the State may
not do so.").
223. See id. at 715-17 (stating that the Court had to determine whether the state had
compelling interest in requiring display of motto on license plates and determining that it did
not).
224. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985)
("Appellant, however, overlooks material differences between disclosure requirements and
outright prohibitions on speech.").
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what would the Court be willing to do that would help to alleviate the
confusion generated by the current CentralHudson/Zauderermuddle?
Given the values that the Supreme Court has tried to protect in its
commercial speech cases, the best solution is a hybrid of strict scrutiny and the
CentralHudson test. First, the test would only apply where the speech at issue
concerned legal and nondeceptive activity. Once that threshold is passed, the
first prong would require a state to establish a compelling interest for enacting
the regulation, and the second prong would require that the regulation directly
advance the state's interest and that no less restrictive regulation would serve
the state's interest; recall that this part of the Central Hudson standard
emphatically departs from the strict scrutiny narrow tailoring inquiry.2 25 The
second prong of the test would additionally be supplemented by the
requirement that courts study regulators' evidence supporting their compelled
disclosure regimes before drawing their conclusions, thereby allowing states to
show direct advancement where none is evident on the regulation's face. The
first prong of the test, requiring the state to have a compelling interest for
enacting the regulation, has been suggested in the speech suppression context
For truly important governmental objectives, this
by Justice Thomas.2 2
approach would allow regulation, but it would preserve the important value of
the right not to speak if the government were not advancing a compelling
goal.22 While this approach might lessen the amount of regulation government
is allowed to undertake, the more likely result would be better-considered

policy and a fully developed basis for passing

laws.228

Indeed, even when a

lower standard has been required, government units have often developed full
Ideally, requiring states to have a
records to justify' their regulations. 2
compelling purpose for regulating speech would eliminate regulation where
"the sound background presumption againstgovernment intervention has not

225. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (stating that the
standard here is a reasonable fit between the legislature's ends and means, not the least
restrictive means standard from strict scrutiny).
226. See id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I continue to believe that... strict scrutiny is
appropriate, whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as 'commercial.').
227. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977) (implying that compelling state
interests will pass through First Amendment analysis unscathed).
228. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA 1), 509 F. Supp.
2d 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating New York's case for Regulation 81.50, resting mainly on
costs of obesity).
229. See id (stating the City's position that Regulation 81.50 would result in consumers
having more knowledge about what they eat, which would eventually lead to lower levels of
obesity).
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been overcome," 230 while allowing regulation when the state has demonstrated
a true need.
Once the compelling interest prong of the test has been established, this
test would borrow from Central Hudson and require that the regulation
"directly advance[] the governmental interest asserted" 2 3'1and be "no[] more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." 232 Admittedly, taking this
prong into account, the proposed test would be more stringent than Central
Hudson, and only slightly less demanding than strict scrutiny. This rigor,
however, is justified by the Supreme Court's increasing protection of
commercial speech 233 and by the fact that it maintains the lesser level of
protection given to commercial actors when they are compelled to give
disclosures (as opposed to when their speech is suppressed). Indeed, the Court
has made clear that regulators do not have to choose the narrowest means
possible, but merely a reasonable fit.234 The desired outcome of this part of the
test would be to give regulators some flexibility in how they create commercial
disclosure requirements-they would not have to choose the narrowest means
possible to promote their interests, but only would have to choose a means that
did not have an obviously better-fitting alternative. This flexibility would be
supplemented by the understanding that courts would study regulators'
evidence of direct advancement, as suggested in CentralHudson.235 Again, the
goal here would be to allow legislators to regulate, while not allowing them to
simply compel commercial speakers to disclose any information they saw fit
without substantial justification. What this would hopefully accomplish is the
most efficient regulation possible-giving the most information to consumers at
the lowest possible cost to business. When regulators can simply impose costs
on businesses at will, they have little incentive to think of lower-cost

230. Epstein, supra note 52, at 1364.
231. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
232. Id.
233. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) (collecting cases to
show that Justices Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Stevens have all variously called for
applying strict scrutiny in commercial speech suppression cases).
234. See id. at 556 (requiring only "a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective").
235. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569 (refuiting state's argument that advertising by
electrical utility led to inequitable rates). The Court stated, "The link between the advertising
prohibition and appellant's rate structure is, at most, tenuous. The impact of promotional
advertising on the equity of appellant's rates is highly speculative." Id. This language at least
leaves the door cracked open for the state to provide evidence that its regulation does in fact
directly advance its interest, even where it does not appear to do so on its face.
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alternatives. On the other hand, if regulators have no way of forcing disclosure
from businesses, practices deleterious to public health and societal well-being
could go on unchecked. The key is to find a middle ground, and this proposed
standard is one possible way to find that ground.
D. Applying ProposedTest to Real- World Regulations
1. Regulation 81.50
This Note's proposed test would require governments to justify their
regulations under a two-pronged analysis. The first prong would require
governments to have compelling reasons for enacting their compelled
disclosure regimes, and the second prong would require that the regulations
directly advance the governmental interest and that the government's interest
would not be as well served by a more limited restriction on free speech. 3
How would Regulation 81.50 fare under this test? Given that this Note has
already argued that the regulation would fail the CentralHudson test,2 11 it also
would obviously fail the tougher new standard. However, while this Note
argued that the regulation failed the second prong of the test, in that it did not
directly advance the state's interest and was not sufficiently narrowly
tailored, 3 there is a good argument that it advances the compelling state
interest of protecting consumer health .239 Thus, although Regulation 81.50
ultimately fails this proposed test, it at least has a good chance of passing its
first prong, meaning that it would have a chance to be acceptable under the
second prong if it were more carefully crafted. California has adopted a statute
similar to Regulation 81.5 0, but which has temporary provisions that, if applied
permanently, would pass the proposed test.

236. See supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text (explaining reasons for proposing
two-pronged test and providing precedents to support the test).
237. See supraPart IV.B3 (arguing that Regulation 81.50 would fail final two prongs of the
CentralHudson test).
238. See supranotes 20 1-12 and accompanying text (arguing that Regulation § 81.50 fails
the second prong of proposed test).
239. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 582 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (assuming for the sake of argument that there is a compelling state interest in
preventing children from smoking).
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2. CaliforniaLaw

In late 2008, the state of California passed a law intended to require
restaurants to disclose nutritional information to their customers on the
premises.24
The law's permanent provisions are quite similar to
Regulation 81.50, requiring restaurants with twenty or more outlets in the state
to provide nutritional information on their menus and menu boards by January
1, 201 1.241 Because of its similarity to Regulation 81.50, this part of
California's Health and Safety Code would be struck down under this Note's
proposed framework. However, the statute sets up a grace period until January
1, 2011, allowing restaurants to disclose their regulations in places other than
their menu boards. 4 If the legislature had adopted the grace period provisions
as the main corpus of the statute, the regulatory scheme might well satisfy' this
Note's proposed test. First, assume once again that ensuring citizens'

continued good health is a compelling state interest.243 Then, test this provision
against the requirement that compelled disclosure laws directly advance the
state's interest. Here, the California rules would run into the same difficulty as
Regulation 81.50, namely that it takes several logical leaps to find that it

directly advances the state's interest.24 However, suppose that California could

document through numerous health studies that its code provision directly
advanced its goal of improving citizens' health. The regulation could then pass
through the first part of the proposed test unscathed. Then, the state would
have to show that it could not have advanced its interest through a regulation
less burdensome on free speech. This is where the temporary part of
California's regulatory scheme is vastly superior to New York's. Because it
allows restaurants numerous options to disclose nutrition information, 4 the
California code provision probably could not accomplish its goals any less
240. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094(b)( 1) (West Supp. 2009) ("[Elvery food
facility shall either disclose nutritional information as required by paragraph (2), or comply with
subdivision (c) during this period of time.").
241. Id. § 114094(c)(1H-4).
242. See id. § 114094(b)(2)(A) (allowing restaurants to comply with disclosure
requirements of the code by disclosing nutritional values on any of the following: a brochure
available on every table; next to items on a menu; an index on the menu listing all items; an
insert in the menu; or putting a table tent on each table).
243. See supra note 239 and accompanying text (presenting the case that citizens' health is
a compelling state interest).
244. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text (explaining that, in the past, courts
have been hesitant to uphold regulations under Central Hudson's direct advancement third
prong when getting to this advancement requires acceptance of several assumptions).
245. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1I14094(b)(2)(A) (giving restaurants a number of
options for disclosing nutrition information).
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restrictively. Indeed, California seems to have given restaurants the flexibility
to disclose nutrition information in nearly any practical way, so long as the
disclosure takes place on the restaurant premiseS. 246 If the state could show, as
seems probable, that disclosure on the restaurant premises is the only way to
advance the state's interest,247 it would probably not fall afoul of Central
Hudson's warning that "[iln the absence of a showing that more limited speech
regulation would be ineffective, we cannot approve the complete suppression of
Central Hudson's advertising. 24 8 This is so because the state appears to have
allowed restaurants to choose their own regulatory regimes from the broadest
possible array of choices, thus mooting any argument that the regulation is too
extensive. Thus, if California were to excise the part of its statute requiring
menu board disclosure starting in January 2011, its statute would pass this
Note's proposed test.
V. Conclusion
While the wisdom of nutritional labeling laws may be uncertain, the far
more damaging uncertainty is in the case law over nutritional labeling in
restaurants. While the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit
have ruled in New York City's favor on the issue, those courts' imprimaturs are
far from final. While it is possible the Supreme Court could rule on the issue,
judicial resolution could take years. Hopefully, if the Supreme Court ever rules
on a statute requiring disclosure of information in the commercial context, it
would adopt a test similar to the one urged in this Note. Again, this test allows
governments some flexibility in regulation, while also insuring that
governments do not infringe, without very good reason, the private actors' right
to refrain from speaking. Improving health and reducing obesity are good, even
compelling, reasons for government to force private actors to speak, but the
government should have the burden to show that its regulations actually
advance those goals in the manner least burdensome on free speech rights. If
the government showed that it had tried a number of less burdensome solutions,
all of which had failed, perhaps courts would then be more sympathetic in their
246. Id
247. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. Bd. of Health (NYSRA4 1), 509 F. Supp. 2d 351,
354 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (recounting restaurants' argument that Regulation 81.50 runs afoul of the
First Amendment because it forces them to give up space on their menu boards). Because the
temporary version of the California statute does not require menu board disclosure, it would not
be subject to the same argument.
248. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571
(1980).
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application of the test proposed in this Note. After all, the failure of less
burdensome regulations might constitute prima facie evidence that less
restrictive regulations simply do not work.
Unless and until the Supreme Court takes a stand on compelled disclosure
laws in this context, both lawmaking bodies and restaurants will be unsure what
their rights and responsibilities are. One possible solution, of course, would be
for restaurants or lawmakers to capitulate-restaurants could stop challenging
regulations or lawmakers could stop promulgating them. Given the
unlikelihood of that course, what are some possible solutions? Clearly, there
should be some middle ground where both legislatures and restaurants could be
satisfied that their interests were being met-but where is that middle ground?
One possible solution is to enact regulatory schemes to which restaurants
will not object. The California regime comes to mind as an example; unless
restaurants genuinely do not want to share nutritional information, they should
have little objection to being given a choice of several relatively unobtrusive
options for providing that information. Another possible solution would be to
require restaurants to post nutritional information online. While part of New
York City's rationale for Regulation 81.50 is that its citizens often ignore
information on the Internet, 4 perhaps states and restaurants could solve that
problem by agreeing on some sort of central repository for nutritional
information from restaurants. Because most if not all restaurants post this
information online anyway,25 they should have little objection to putting the
information in a new type of internet forum. Perhaps this goal could be
249. See Press Release, supra note 50 ("Many chain restaurants already post calorie
information on the Internet, in brochures, or on food wrappers or tray liners. Customers rarely
see this information when they're ordering food, and without it, people greatly underestimate
how many calories are in a meal.").
250. See id. (asserting that some chain restaurants already make efforts to make calorie
information available to their customers); N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City R~d. of Health
(NYSRA 11), No. 08 Civ. l000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,2008) ("[A]
number of fast food restaurants already provide a complete nutritional breakdown of their menu
items in brochures, on posters, or online."). For examples of restaurants that already post
nutritional information online, see the following: Official Subway Restaurants Nutrition
Information, Subway, NutritionalInformation, http://www.subway.comlapplications/Nutrition
Info/index.aspx (follow "Printer-Friendly Nutrition Info" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 22, 2010)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); McDonald's, Nutrition Info,
http://nutrition.mcdonalds.com/nutfitionexchange/nutritionexchange.do (last visited Mar. 22,
2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Chipotle, Chipotle Nutrition,
http://www.chipotle.conm/ChipotleNutrition.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Wendy's, Nutrition Facts & Topics for Healthy Eating,
http://www.wendys.com/food/NutritionLanding.jsp (last visited Mar. 22, 2010) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). These are just a few examples of the many restaurants that
post nutritional information online.
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achieved by federal legislation that explicitly preempts efforts like New York's,
thus settling the issue once and for all. On the other hand, if states insist on
having the information available physically in restaurants, the state could pass a
law like the rump California statute discussed in Part IV.D.2, sup ra, requiring
restaurants to make nutrition information available somewhere on their
premises-not necessarily on their menus. This would give the restaurants
considerable flexibility and address one of their key concerns, that the current
nutritional laws mandate use of valuable space on their menu boards' 25 ' while
also ensuring that the state's goal of complete and accurate information for
customers is met. The hope would be that by passing considerably less heavyhanded legislation and allowing flexibility, the state would lessen the
restaurants' desire to see laws concerning nutritional disclosure overturned
while maintaining the ability to protect citizens' health.
Regardless of possible statutory solutions, the key in this area is to find a
workable legal standard that protects restaurants' ability not to speak and allows
lawmakers to regulate in the interest of citizens' health. The test proposed in
this Note is merely a starting point, and presumes that the Supreme Court is
serious about giving greater protection to commercial speech. Even if the
Court does not go down the road of submitting restrictions of commercial
speech to strict scrutiny, however, it could still apply a higher standard of
scrutiny to compelled disclosure regimes than is currently the case. After all,
truly important government programs do not need deferential treatment because
they should withstand higher levels of scrutiny, and programs that advance less
important interests should not be given deference. Even if the Court got serious
about applying the rational basis test only to disclosures meant to prevent
consumer deception, that would be a start.

25 1. See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NIYSRA 1), 509 F. Supp. 2d
351, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Regulation 81.50 requires restaurants to post caloric content on
menu boards, the most valued space in the restaurant.... [TIhe regulation will make menu
boards confusing and are [sic] likely to adversely impact restaurants to which the regulation
applies." (internal citations and quotations omnitted)).

